viernes, 28 de enero de 2011

The EU Council Presidency 2.0: New treaties, new member states, new communication

The EU Council Presidency 2.0: New treaties, new member states, new communication: "

The description of my blog says that “I attempt to translate between political science and political practice in EU matters“.


Yesterday was a day full of opportunities for this. I could start talking about the combination of science and practice for the blog post and paper “Transparency in the Financing of Europarties” that I wrote together with colleagues. I could also describe the interaction between scientists, consultants, civil society representatives, EU officials and Members of the European Parliament in the expert meeting on “The misuse of EU funds by organised crime” I participated in yesterday afternoon in the EP.


But maybe most interesting, for many reasons, was the bloggers’ meeting that we – Europasionaria, Mathew, Jean-Sébastien, and me (all co-editors of Bloggingportal.eu) as well as Dániel – had with Gergely Polner, spokesperson of the current EU Council Presidency held by Hungary in the Hungarian Permanent Representation to the EU.


In more than two hours of a very open, informal, and discursive discussion, we covered many different topics, which, from a political science point of view, would each offer an own research paper.


Gergely agreed that most of the discussion would be “on the record”, so apart from some personal comments he made, we were talking frankly while being able to blog about the topics touched upon in our discussion. We spent a long time on possible relations between EU and national bloggers and the HU presidency (i.e. EU Council communication 2.0), but since I expect the others to write about this, I’ll focus on some issues more interesting for political scientists.


The first thing is the new role of the Council presidency, now that the Lisbon Treaty is fully in place. In this new role, relations with the EU Parliament (EP) have become more important since this institutions has much more powers than before.


Gergely estimated that about 50% of what they as the presidency do today is involving the EP. He said that this was a gut figure, but even the perception of the relevance of the EP may change its actual influence. Also very remarkably is that Gergely is in fact an employee of the EU Parliament, seconded to the Hungarian Presidency. In political science, I had mainly heard about national officials being seconded to the EU Commission, but Gergely told that it was a common practice before that Commission officials would be seconded to the Presidencies. However, he and a colleague of his are (as far as he knew) the first EP employees ever to be seconded to a presidency. Before joining the Hungarian team, Gergely was working at the EP’s representation in London; he’ll return to the EP afterwards.


Another observations related to the Lisbon Treaty that could be observed while we were there is the relevance of the new European External Action Service (EEAS): Early during our meeting, the secretary of the communications team came to tell that a large international media company was calling. Gergely left the room and we started joking around what a similar call we could get as bloggers. But before we could come up with a good idea, Gergely was back in the room and told that the question that he had been asked by the media laid in the competence of Catherine Ashton and that he’d refrain from interfering in her field.


The latter shows that, beyond losing the leadership in the European Council (held by European Council President van Rompuy) and having to share powers with the EP, the presidency has clearly lost an important part of its former external action role, including in communications.


Apart from that, the Hungarians after the Czechs and the Slovenians are only the third member state that has joined since 2004 to take over the Council presidency, and Gergely made clear that for the country, its administrations and politicians, the amount of preparation – several years of training for diplomats and officials – and the subsequent rise in qualification was confirming the old (EU) saying that a country only becomes a real member after it has held the Council presidency.


We also discussed some policy issues, including the Hungarian media law – a topic Gergely had offered to talk about when we started to prepare the meeting some weeks ago. You should know that we at the Bloggingportal.eu started a “European Blog Action against Censorship in Hungary“, so there was some interest in this topic on both sides.


He told that this topic had been on their monitoring agenda before the presidency started, but that the amount of international media reactions still had surprised them. He himself was kept busy by this topic all along his Christmas and New Year.


What he said about the Hungarian Presidency’s role in this matter resembled a the argumentation his colleague György had voiced on the Presidency Blog in December: The officials involved in the Presidency feel themselves as representatives of the Council as an institution, in a way being the representatives of 27 member states and not the representatives of a country.


They see their role in making the Council work smoothly, bringing decision-making in important fields forward, and not to represent their country as such. This has to be seen in the context of the long training many of these officials have had over the recent years, trying to become experts in EU politics and EU policies, not defenders of a single law in their home country.


I’m not sure whether this is the case for all officials, but Gergely made a convincing case of this. Yet, he said that he still accepted that we’d see this differently, that this professional separation of roles is something the outside world might not be able or willing to accept.


In the end, the work of the Hungarian Presidency would be judged on a number of issues, and the focus that the Hungarians have can be well understood by reading the conclusions on the Czech EU Council Presidency that Vit Benes and Jan Karlas came up with last year (September 2010) in the scientifically quite important “Journal of Common Market Studies”:



The Czech Presidency performed especially well in the sphere of external energy security and in EU relations with eastern Europe. […] The Czech Presidency also managed to handle institutional issues well. Due to a number of successful results, the Presidency was (though with varying success) able to disconfirm the view that it would be marked by a lack of competence and enthusiasm.


However, with regard to several other issues the Presidency could be considered less effective. […] [T]he stress on external energy security came at the expense of progress in environmental issues. […]“



The Hungarians thus will be faced by different policy issues, and although the outside world may not really take note, they will be evaluated on how they deal with these issues within the EU and diplomatic community. On the other hand, the Hungarians will face global phenomena and intra-EU struggles, as did the Czechs (same source as before):


“The global financial crisis was arguably the main issue on the EU agenda in the first half of 2009 which provokes a few further observations. First, the clash between the Presidency representatives and their French counterparts revealed the consequences following from the complexity of the Presidency roles. […]


Second, the way the Czech Presidency handled the financial crisis also showed how the functioning of the Presidency trio and the co-operation between the Presidency and other EU institutions depend on the convergence of preferences. […]


Third, the Czech Presidency’s actions on the financial crisis also showed that the new Member States as Presidency countries are not very likely to serve on a permanent basis as the defenders of the new Member States’ common interests.


In the end, the media law or the upcoming constitutional reform in Hungary will dominate the international image of the Hungarian Presidency, but for the officials involved in the EU Council work, these policy-struggles and the way they have managed them will count more than how their government or majority party in the parliament have governed at home.


We may not like this, but this is how they think and how they feel. And even though we may not like this, it was great that Gergely took the time to discuss all this (and more) openly with a bunch of bloggers he had never met before. If all officials and institutions had such an approach to the non-traditional-media outside world, we’d witness a minor cultural revolution…


In the end, he has offered to continue these talks in the near future to give more background insights into the work of the Presidency, both in substance and in procedure.


The next meeting will be in two weeks, and we’ll discuss cybercrime issues coming up in the Council and the complex world on interpretation regimes in the EU Council. If anyone is interested in joining, just tell!


"

jueves, 27 de enero de 2011

Innovation Union - Innovation made in the EU

Innovation Union - Innovation made in the EU: "We've added another page to the Innovation Union web site. In it, there are four sections which you can reach by clicking on the revolving images on the HOME page:
• Innovation made in EU: a rich visual display showcasing research projects supported by the EU and the results that may well change our daily lives in the future
• Facts and figures: learn more about Europe's innovation performance
• Innovation in motion: a selection of the finest and most amusing videos on innovation, research and entrepreneurship produced by the European Commission
• Innovation Union online: a summary of the interactive sections of this site, the futuristic stories (coming soon!) and the videos."

Making the External Action Service more effective

Making the External Action Service more effective: "

By Thomas Renard


A team of experts from the Centre for European Policy Studies, the Egmont Institute, European Policy Centre and the University of Leuven joined forces to produce a timely book on European diplomacy, on the occasion of the launch of the European Union’s External Action Service.


This book investigates two crucial factors that will in part determine whether the innovations and ambitions of the Lisbon Treaty for the European Union as a foreign policy actor will fructify: first, its status in the multitude of multilateral organisations and international agreements that deal with matters of European competence; and secondly, the structure of European diplomacy (i.e. the personnel strengths and costs of the twenty-seven Member State diplomacies alongside the new European External Action Service).


The book is original as there has been no systematic account available on either of these subjects. Going beyond this information function, the report also formulates recommendations for where the European Union’s status in the international arena is inadequate, for example in the United Nations system, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and forward-looking scenarios for the restructuring of European diplomacy, with a rationalisation of the foreign services of the European Union (to be expanded) and its Member States (to be slimmed down).


The small-minded book-keeper’s concept of budget neutrality for the External Action Service alone, which seems still to prevail among various Member States, is replaced by a sounder public finance objective, namely to make significant net economies in the combined diplomatic services of Member States, cutting duplicative waste in their own foreign services. The time horizon for these tasks is the next decade or two.


The premise is that the European Union should seek to build up a world-class diplomatic corps, capable of becoming a major actor in global affairs. There are interest groups in the Member States’ foreign ministries that prefer to stick to the status quo, and seek to minimise the restructuring of European diplomacy. However, in the view of the authors (as independent analysts), fundamental changes in the nature of global affairs mean that this conservatism is indefensible, and would only result in an increasingly obsolete, irrelevant and wasteful European diplomacy.



  • Please click here to order the book or download it.



  • Michael Emerson, Rosa Balfour, Tim Corthaut, Jan Wouters, Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, Thomas Renard (2011), Upgrading the European Union’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies).


"

jueves, 20 de enero de 2011

Can Greece be saved?

Can Greece be saved?: "by Katinka Barysch

Will Greece have to restructure its debt? Among most West European economists and investors, this now seems to be a foregone conclusion. The Greeks themselves are not so sure. During a recent visit to Athens, none of the economists and politicians I spoke to thought that restructuring was inevitable or desirable. The Papandreou government looks determined. But to avoid default, Greece would need two things: economic growth and more help from its European neighbours.

Since Greece negotiated its €110 billion financial assistance package with the EU and the IMF last year, it has cut its government deficit by an impressive 6 per cent of GDP. The government has slashed public salaries and pensions, raised VAT and other taxes, and clamped down on ubiquitous tax evasion. Half a dozen big strikes and the occasional outbreak of street fighting notwithstanding, the Greeks have so far remained rather stoic in the face of this unprecedented belt tightening. Most realise that change is needed and hardship inevitable.

The other reason why Greeks have so far stayed calm is that the worst is yet to come. While civil servants, truckers and some other groups felt immediate pain, the population at large has not yet suffered unbearably. After 15 years of rising salaries, most Greeks can cope with an initial drop in income. Those who lose their job or business can usually rely on a tightly knit family network for support.

Greece, however, is not even half way through its deficit cutting programme. The total need for adjustment is 13-15 per cent of GDP. Cutting the first 20 or 30 per cent out of any budget is relatively easy – especially in a budget that contains as much flab as the Greek one. The public sector is overstaffed and, in many places, overpaid; pension entitlements are generous; although 60 per cent of the population lives in the capital, Greece has over 1,000 municipal administrations and 52 regional ones (a new law will cut those numbers by two-thirds); the country’s 150 public hospitals are accounting-free zones, which has contributed to spiralling healthcare costs; public enterprise such as the railways are black holes for government subsidies.

Once the most glaring inefficiencies have been removed, however, further reductions will get a lot harder. After the fat is gone, the government will have to cut bone. Papandreou needs to perform this operation at a time when the economy is in deep recession: by the end of this year, GDP will have contracted by as much as 10 per cent; unemployment is heading towards 15 per cent; among younger people, one in three is out of work; thousands of businesses are closing down every month.

Even if the government managed to stay on track with its plans for budget consolidation, public debt would continue to rise inexorably, to over 150 per cent of GDP by the end of this year. Greece will only stand a chance of generating the revenue needed to service such high debt if it returns to economic growth, and quickly.

The bad news is that in order to regain its competitiveness Greece will require an internal ‘devaluation’ – a fall in real wages relative to its trading partners. Such wage compression will dampen consumption and could even lead to damaging deflation. And it would not even address the deeper problem that Greece makes few things that people in other countries want to buy. Growth since the 1990s was led by consumption and fuelled by cheap foreign credit. To move to a more sustainable growth model, the country requires higher value-added industries and massive foreign investment. Neither will materialise without very thorough economic and institutional reforms. “In terms of institutions, infrastructure and corruption, Greece looks a bit like a third world country”, sighs one Greek fund manager based in London.

The somewhat better news is that Greece’s economy is so inefficient that a series of straightforward changes could kick-start an economic expansion. “In many sectors, our economy resembles Soviet central planning”, explains Yannis Stournaras, who runs the IOBE institute for economic and industrial research. “If we remove stifling regulation and bureaucracy, the economy’s dynamism will be unbound.” IOBE has calculated that liberalisation of the most heavily shackled sectors and professions would lift output by 10 per cent over four years, and probably more once dynamic, growth-boosting effects are taken into account.

Having implemented a first bout of budget-cutting policies, the Papandreou government is now setting to work on structural reforms. If things go according to plan, some 70 ‘closed shop’ professions, from lawyers to pharmacists and civil engineers, will lose many of their privileges and protections. Hiring and firing workers will get easier across the board. State enterprises will be restructured, downsized and sold off. Red tape for businesses will be cut. New incentives will boost investment in green energy, high-end tourism and other potential growth industries.

These plans are already creating fierce opposition from the highly organised groups that will be directly affected. The two main political parties, but Pasok in particular, rely on the trade unions and professional bodies for their core support. “Attacking the closed-shop professions means civil war within Pasok”, predicts Loukas Tsoukalis, head of Eliamep, a think-tank in Athens. Already, some Pasok MPs are grumbling that the reforms are now going too far, too fast. More strikes are inevitable.

Curiously, Greeks tend to sympathise with the plight of even the most molly-coddled public sector workers and privileged professionals. Faced with rising opposition within his own party and public restiveness, Papandreou’s resolve may yet falter.

Even if it does not, Papandreou will face the immovable object of his own state administration. Structural reforms will only boost growth if they are implemented swiftly and effectively. The chances of this happening are slim. A law going back to the post-dictatorship days makes the dismissal of civil servants illegal; even sacking public sector workers who do not strictly speaking enjoy civil service status is considered politically impossible. Each administration since the 1980s has added ‘its’ people to an already outsized state apparatus, often in return for votes and political support. The result is a public sector that is not only hopelessly bloated (roughly 800,000 out of a workforce of five million) but one that is infused with a sense of entitlement, rather than public duty.

Until and unless growth resumes, Greece will struggle to cope with its stifling debt burden. Greeks hope that the EU will step in again to tide the country over until the economy recovers. Many hope that Germany will drop its opposition to joint eurozone bonds, which would help to lower the interest rate at which Greece borrows and refinances its debt. Others suggest that the EU could ‘front-load’ regional aid to boost Greek investment over the next couple of years.

If no further EU help is forthcoming, or the debt burden proves unsustainable, Greece may yet be forced to negotiate a rescheduling or restructuring with its creditors. Since Greek politicians are loath to consider the default option publicly, this would come as a shock to many ordinary Greeks. Many might be directly affected if (as seems likely) a public debt restructuring triggers a crisis within the Greek banking sector and social security funds. Most Greeks would consider default as a terminal blow to the country’s standing inside the EU.

Greeks have traditionally been very pro-EU, and not only because the country has been one of the biggest recipients of EU structural funds since the 1980s. All political parties, with the exception of the Communists, are in favour of more European integration. Remarkably few Greeks have so far blamed the EU (or the IMF for that matter) for the hardship they are going through – although Germans, and Chancellor Merkel in particular, are deeply unpopular for dithering over the bail-out and lecturing the Greeks about their allegedly lazy and lavish ways.

If Greece was forced to restructure, politicians and public opinion could quickly turn against the EU. “The Greeks would say: We’ve been through pain and austerity, and now you drop us”, predicts Panagiotis Ioakeimidis, professor at Athens university and an EU specialist. Some Greeks fear that after default, Greece’s membership in the euro, and the EU itself, may be questioned. That is why the Greeks will hold out fiercely against any pressure to consider restructuring.

Katinka Barysch is deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
"

Serbia: another step closer to EU

Serbia: another step closer to EU: "Members of the European Parliament (EP) ratified the Stability and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia on 19 January. Enikő Győri, Minister of State for EU Affairs, thanked EP Members on behalf of the Hungarian Presidency, and expressed hope that mem-ber states will soon approve the agreement so that it can take effect."

miércoles, 19 de enero de 2011

The Next Big Thing in Managing Innovation

The Next Big Thing in Managing Innovation: "

By Dr. Henry Chesbrough


The first decade of the 21st century brought about an incredible amount of technological advances — Facebook, Twitter, Android, iPod/iTunes/iPhone/iPad, and many other innovations transformed how we communicate, work, and live. But it is often the processes that helped create and manage these technologies that prove most enduring. Understanding the most important management innovations of the past will inform how we continue to expand and build on our knowledge to improve the innovation process in the future and advance human progress. So with a decade just ended, it is a good time to take stock of recent developments, and then look ahead to likely future management innovations…


Click here to read the rest of this column on HBR.org.

"

martes, 18 de enero de 2011

Mapping the European Union’s interests

Mapping the European Union’s interests: "

By James Rogers


The Egmont Institute (Royal Institute for International Relations) in Brussels has just published my latest booklet on European geostrategy in the twenty-first century, where I introduce the concept of the European Union’s ‘Grand Area’:


Please click on the map to enlarge it


I project that this region – the ‘Grand Area’ – will become the biggest concern and geostrategic interest for the European Union over the coming decades. Not only is this region the most important zone for the future of European industrial expansion and the durability of the European economy more generally, but it is also the most likely space to experience geopolitical struggle as emerging and surrounding great powers seek to control its plentiful resources.


I argue that the time has come for a new geography of European power, which should be based around a sophisticated ‘forward presence’ that emphasises the preventative dimension of military power. As I point out, this would allow the European Union and its Member States to overcome the sporadic and reactive approach they have taken to security since the foundation of the European Security and Defence Policy in the late 1990s. It will also provision them with the means to uphold their interests and values in an uncertain world over the coming decades.


• Please click here to download the entire booklet.


"

lunes, 17 de enero de 2011

Preguntas y respuestas sobre la iniciativa ciudadana

Preguntas y respuestas sobre la iniciativa ciudadana: "
Los ciudadanos de la UE pronto podrán pedir a la UE que introduzca nueva legislación, siempre que reúnan un millón de firmas. El Tratado de Lisboa instauró esta nueva herramienta para permitir a los ciudadanos que opinasen de forma más directa sobre la UE.

Fuente : © Parlamento Europeo
"

miércoles, 12 de enero de 2011

Is Open Innovation Here to Stay? “The Economist” Video Interview with Henry Chesbrough

Is Open Innovation Here to Stay? “The Economist” Video Interview with Henry Chesbrough: "

Dr. Henry Chesbrough recently discussed the open innovation model with The Economist. Below, please find the video which is featured on The Economist’s “Ideas Economy” blog.



Click here to access the “Ideas Economy” blog

"

Transforming Government Agencies Through Open Innovation: A Blog Series from Dustin Haisler

Transforming Government Agencies Through Open Innovation: A Blog Series from Dustin Haisler: "

It’s week two of Dustin Haisler’s 10-part blog series on open innovation and how it can transform government agencies. Click here to access his blog on GovLoop.


GovLoop is a social network for the government community to connect and share information.


Image via flickr.

"

Gobernanza económica de la UE: la Comisión fija las prioridades anuales para el crecimiento en la UE

Gobernanza económica de la UE: la Comisión fija las prioridades anuales para el crecimiento en la UE: "IP/11/22 Bruselas, 12 de enero de 2011 Europa dispone de un plan general para responder a la crisis y acelerar el crecimiento económico de Europa. Ahora debe coordinar sus esfuerzos y centrarse en las prioridades...."

Ayudas estatales: la Comisión exige a España que suprima el régimen fiscal que favorece las adquisiciones en países de fuera de la UE

Ayudas estatales: la Comisión exige a España que suprima el régimen fiscal que favorece las adquisiciones en países de fuera de la UE: "IP/11/26 Bruselas, 12 de enero de 2011 La Comisión ha solicitado a España, con arreglo a las normas sobre ayudas estatales de la UE, que suprima una disposición de 2002 del impuesto de sociedades español que permite a las empresas españolas amortizar ..."

lunes, 3 de enero de 2011

Europa, Europa (II)


La Comisión ha publicado el 20 de diciembre una Comunicación en la que destaca los problemas fiscales más graves a los que se enfrentan los ciudadanos de la UE en situaciones transfronterizas y anuncia planes para buscar soluciones. Cuando los ciudadanos se trasladan, trabajan o invierten en un país extranjero pueden ser objeto de una doble imposición fiscal y encontrar dificultades al reclamar devoluciones de impuestos o solicitar información sobre normas fiscales extranjeras. La Comunicación anuncia medidas en algunos aspectos, como los ingresos de un país a otro, los impuestos de sucesión, los impuestos sobre los dividendos y de matriculación, así como el comercio electrónico. La Comunicación de hoy también tiene por objeto determinar si pueden adoptarse otras medidas, tanto a escala nacional como de la UE, para que los sistemas fiscales de los Estados miembros sean más compatibles y no disuadir así a los ciudadanos de emprender actividades transfronterizas.
Algirdas Šemeta, Comisario de Fiscalidad, Unión Aduanera, Lucha contra el Fraude y Auditoría, ha declarado lo siguiente: «La fiscalidad tiene un papel fundamental que desempeñar en la consolidación del mercado interior y en la construcción de una economía europea fuerte y sostenible. Unas políticas fiscales adecuadas pueden fomentar el empleo, la inversión y el crecimiento. La Comunicación de hoy constituye un paso más hacia la anulación de los obstáculos fiscales y el fomento de una fiscalidad justa dentro de la UE, para que los ciudadanos puedan disfrutar de todos los beneficios que ofrece el mercado único.».
Problemas por resolver
Todos los años, los problemas fiscales transfronterizos representan una parte considerable de todas las reclamaciones y dudas que los ciudadanos de la UE envían a la Comisión. Las reclamaciones cubren una amplia gama de aspectos: desde las dificultades relacionadas con la complejidad de las normas fiscales extranjeras, hasta la falta de información clara a los extranjeros y la incompatibilidad de sistemas en los diferentes Estados miembros. A los trabajadores fronterizos les resulta difícil obtener desgravaciones, exenciones y deducciones fiscales ante las autoridades tributarias extranjeras y suelen ser objeto de doble imposición. Los ciudadanos que adquieren propiedades en países extranjeros se quejan con frecuencia de que no se les aplican exenciones fiscales o que deben pagar impuestos sobre la propiedad más elevados que los residentes, mientras que trasladar o comprar coches al otro lado de la frontera supone pagar por duplicado el impuesto de matriculación. Las personas que tienen rentas procedentes de inversiones en otro país encuentran problemas a la hora de reclamar derechos de exención de la retención a cuenta aplicados por países extranjeros.
Muchas personas con fondos de pensiones extranjeros tienen problemas con las deducciones y las transferencias de un país a otro, mientras que las herencias procedentes de otro Estado miembro suelen estar sujetas a derechos de sucesión más elevados o a una doble imposición. El comercio electrónico se ve gravemente amenazado por los obstáculos fiscales, por ejemplo normas complicadas de aplicación del IVA y obligaciones en materia de suministro de información, por lo que solo el 7 % de los productos comercializados dentro de la UE se han comprado por Internet desde otro Estado miembro.
La mitad de los procedimientos de infracción en materia de fiscalidad que la Comisión inicia cada año tienen relación con denuncias de ciudadanos. No obstante, las infracciones no lo resuelven todo. La mejor manera de solucionar problemas como la doble imposición y las complejidades administrativas consiste en establecer una cooperación adecuada entre Estados miembros. De acuerdo con la Comunicación de hoy, los Estados miembros deben crear y aplicar medidas y prácticas fiscales que no disuadan a los ciudadanos de emprender actividades transfronterizas. También deben coordinarse más estrechamente entre ellos para evitar que normas fiscales desarmonizadas supongan obstáculos y barreras al mercado interior.
Resolver los problemas
La Comisión pretende incrementar sus esfuerzos para contribuir a que los sistemas fiscales de los Estados miembros sean más compatibles y proponer medidas concretas para evitar o eliminar los problemas de fiscalidad que afectan a los ciudadanos de la UE. La Comunicación establece varias iniciativas en este ámbito. Entre ellas se incluye:
  • Una Comunicación sobre doble imposición en 2011, que examine el alcance y la gravedad de este problema en toda la UE, seguida de propuestas legislativas en 2012 que propongan soluciones.
  • A mediados de 2011, propuestas para solucionar los problemas transfronterizos vinculados al impuesto de sucesiones.
  • Medidas par resolver el problema de la doble imposición que se plantea cuando se matricula primero un coche en un Estado miembro y luego se traslada a otro, donce se vuelve a matricular.
  • Ampliación del sistema de la «ventanilla única» al comercio electrónico para que las obligaciones de las empresas en materia de suministro de información sean mucho más sencillas y les sea más fácil ofrecer bienes y servicios por Internet a los consumidores extranjeros. Los obstáculos al comercio electrónico también pueden resolverse con la revisión del régimen del IVA de la UE, en relación con la cual se ha abierto una consulta (véase IP/10/1633).
  • Propuestas en 2012 para solucionar los problemas relativos a la fiscalidad de los dividendos transfronterizos.