The Arctic is fast becoming the site of the twenty-first century’s first geopolitical and geoeconomic scramble. The 2008 United States Geological Survey indicated large amounts of undiscovered oil under the seabed of the American continent and undiscovered gas off the Russian coastline. The report also suggests that thirty percent of the estimated ninety billion barrels of oil and twenty-eight percent of the 1667 trillion cubic meters of gas fall into zones (beyond the continental shelf of a given state) that are either currently contested between two of the five High Arctic States, or which would require a shared division based on either a bilateral agreement or a successful claim under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
But an ‘online Arctic’ needs more than just Klondike-like resources. It requires access. New drilling technology and ship design combined with shrinking Arctic ice, present a picture of improved access to hostile northern conditions, while the ongoing global demand for oil and gas remains the key catalyst for northern ventures. While most of the indicated hydrocarbons are not within areas likely to be contested, the prospect of boosting either current dominance or future potential is still appealing, and has driven the five High Arctic States – Russia, Canada, Norway, the United States and Denmark – to assert claims to portions of the Arctic region where ownership has not yet been fully established. Other Arctic actors like Sweden, Finland, Iceland and even the European Union, are increasingly keen to get a territorial or policy-based toehold in attempts to ‘name and claim’ the Arctic. As a result, their activities are beginning to transform the region into an area of both geopolitical interest and geo-economic potential.
Problems remain however. Access to Arctic resources is not yet assured. The precise offshore location of the hydrocarbons raises potential issues of sovereignty over natural resources, the extent and possible extension of continental shelves, sector claims, and the risk of protracted disputes over maritime boundaries. Bilateral agreements and claims made under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea have both been tried, but outstanding spats exist between all of the High Arctic States, some of whom have yet to submit claims. Another challenge are the surprisingly varied interpretations of where the Arctic is. Arctic players – like the Arctic itself, can be stringently or broadly understood. Does one necessarily need a coastline, or is territory across or above the Arctic Circle also a qualifier? Or does one merely require a policy on the region?
The traditional foreign policy response is that the five High Arctic States (Russia, United States, Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland) are the pre-eminent Arctic players by virtue of their coastal adjacency to the North Pole. All but Denmark have also explicitly identified the Arctic as a key part of their national energy security policies. A wider perspective suggests that ‘policy presence’ rather than ‘polar proximity’ is an equally compelling rationale by which to claim an Arctic toehold. Lacking an Arctic coastline, Finland, Sweden and Iceland have long been active Arctic actors because of their commitment to High North biodiversity issues.
Equally, while the European Union can make neither maritime claims to the Arctic in terms of territorial jurisdiction, nor has the legal competence to make claims to any part of the Arctic, it has since 2008 considered itself to be both a ‘natural and legitimate player’ in the Arctic. While traditional Arctic states may find this far-fetched, the European Union could in the medium term push forward on key policies like fisheries, biodiversity and climate change in a way that transform Brussels from a marginal voice into a ‘policy purveyor’ on issues of state behaviour in the Arctic. With three Member States – Sweden, Finland, and Denmark – and two European Economic Area members (Norway and Iceland) contained within the Arctic region, the European Union has come to see itself as a natural heir to the High North. Long-term forecasts are therefore to watch the European Union’s ability to strengthen its policy clout in this area; most likely with a more sensible understanding of combining its Arctic ambitions with emerging energy security issues.
Amelia Hadfield is Professor of European Affairs at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and a Senior Researcher at the Institute for European Studies. She teaches European foreign and public policy analysis.
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